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Income Maintenance I'roglanis
and the Reagan Donwistic Agenda
I IOWARL) JACOI KARGER
I.ouisiana State University
School of Social Work
lnceoip min tetmince J'roanis arc a ket fealttre of the Amnerican -,elfaMr"
stle. The inpac of It Rcagat adltibiishation's Social roevfilre policies
(01 exaniued in this articlc, which also slpcculales al'end Ihe Il oins-t'rm
teficls of his icc.sse,. on the future of iw'ome mainh'lrun program,;.
Sjv i f( a/li,, this artich pivides a brief hislorical btaiekrotind of inconw
mnaiIeniance pnvg ratns, examines Rcaattn's ideological and strategic all-
prolch to deconshic'ilitg (he ztx/'ire" stle evalhula's the dhnlestic se'-
c1'{sMCs of the Reagain asminisl rat lio, ant explores the log-ferin inqpact
of Reagan'sr polwce'; on Ihe fture if incoue saintena'nc' Irorawns.
A precise definition of income maintenance. a le'ast within
the American context- -is elusive. Some policy analysts define
income maintenance programs solt,ly as public assistance pi-
grams, such as Aid Io Families with Dependent Children
(AFD(), General Assistance, and Supplemental Security Incomt
(SSI) (Karger and Stocsz, 1990). Others defint income main-
tenanct, programs nu re broadly Io include public assistanice
programs and social insurance programs such as Social Secu-
rity, Uncmployment Compensation, and Workers' Cormpensa-
tion (1)iNitto and Dye, 1987). For the purposes of this article the
more inclusive definition of income maintenance will be used.
This article provides a brief historical background of income
maintenance programs and describes the major changes that
have occurred in those programs over the last fifty years. It
also) examines the Reagan agenda for limiting [lie income main-
tenance sector, and tht, major shorl- and long-term impact oI
income maintenance programs resulting from Rcagn adminis.-
tration initiatives.
Joirnal of Sociulogy & Social Welfare
The Pre-Reagan Welfare Slate
Since its origins in the mid 1930s, (he American welfare
state has been an amalgam of ideologically disparate programs.
Unlike European welfare stales such as Britain, the American
welfare state did not emerge from a coherent social vision. In-
stead, Franklin 0. Roosevelt created a patchwork welfare state
in response to the social volatility of [he li )epression and lhe
need to salvage what remained of capitalism. Ongoing public
assistance-based income maintenance programs for the poor-
what has been transformed into AFDC arid SSI-were periph-
eral to the primary social insurance focus nf the New Deal. Even
the tenuous security offered by the fledgling American welfare
state was uneven. For example, unemployment insurance was
not generous in its benefits, and Social Security originally ex-
cluded certain groups of workers, notably domestics and agri-
cultural workers. Despite these flaws, public assislance-based
income maintenance programs grew because they addressed
importanl social needs.
The expectation that welfare programs would lead to greater
equalily, social justice, and Ihe redistribution of income and re-
sources occurred in its most focused form during the Great So-
ciety and War on Poverty programs of the '1960s, a period that
came to represent the halcyon days of liberal social welfare pol-
icy. Important social welfare policies of die iid-1960s included
the Food Stamp Act and the introduction of Medicare and Med-
icaid. At the same time, aggressive social plans were designed
that promised a poverty-free America and a nonsligmatized,
community based, and easily accessible system of social welfare.
To realize these objectives, the Johnson administration devel-
oped myriad programs designed to help low-income children,
families, and communities. Ingrained within these programs
was a belief that the welfare state could ensure equality of op-
portunity and a redistribution of social, economic and political
resources. In one of the rare instances in recent American history
where rhetoric was backed up by fiscal resources, the number
of federal domestic aid programs rose from 200 to 1,100 from
the early 1960s to 1975 (Gilberl, 1986).
America's brief flirtation with bold social welfare initiatives
ended by the early 1970s, and Liberals had few successes to
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point out when pressed to justify the massive expenditures of
the 1960s. While AFDC rolls iripled (from 3 million to 9.6) front
1960 to '1970, social problems, such as drug addictimu, crime,
teenage pregnancy, child abuse, and mental illness continued to
grow. By 1968 the Great Society prograns had become unpop-
ular with the American public and stinging critiques of them
began to appear regularly in newspapers and magazines.
The American welfare stale entered a paradoxical period
with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968. While the bold
social experiments of the War on Poverty were terminated or
reassigned to mainstream federal bureaucracies, the more es-
tablished income maintenance programs-Social Security and
AFDC-grew dramatically.' In addition, when Nixon took of-
fice again in 1972, lie attempted to streamline income maintc-
nance programs by proposing a Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
which called for a guaranteed annual income to replace AFDC,
Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), and Aid to
the Permanently and Totally Disabled (A FrD). While the FAP
was rejected by Congress, the OAA, AB, and APTI) programs
were federalized under a new program called Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI). Although the Nixon administration's aln-
bivalence toward social welfare was followed by two low key
presidencies, the relative lull in social welfare thinking from
1975 to 1979 was abruptly shattered by the explosion of the
Reagan administration.
Vision and Action: The Reagan Welfare State
Unlike the more pragmatic Nixon, Reagan viewed income
maintenance through a highly ideological lens. Charles Ather-
ton ('1989) outlines five propositions that sum up the New
Right's-and by implication Reagan's-socio-political philoso-
phy of income maintenance programs.
First, conservative analysts claim that the welfare state is
paternalistic and antilibertarian. They argue that any state with
the power to shift resources from one group to another rep-
resents a form of econonic tyranny. As such, they focus on
the abridgement of the rights of those coerced into subsidiz-
ing the poor. Second, Conservatives argue that the welfare state
is both ineffectual and counterproductive. Third, Conservatives
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
contend that the welfare state is too expensive, its results are
spurious, and they doubt whether the gains made by welfare
programs justify spending 17% of the U.S. Gross National Prod-
uct (GNP). Fourth, Conservatives believe that the welfare state
is based on faulty principles of social engineering that even-
tually lead to centralized planning and a managed economy.
Lastly, the welfare state is viewed by many conservatives as
having lost sight of basic American values (Gilder, 1981). Ac-
cording to these critics, the welfare state does not reinforce the
work ethic; the goal of self-sufficiency, self-suppoir, and self-
initiative; the importance of intact families (Mead, 1985); the
fiscal responsibility of the parent to the child; and the notion
of reciprocity-the idea that recipients have an obligation to
behave in a socially acceptable manner in return fur receiving
assistance.
Reagan's views on income maintenance were informed by
the simple philosophy that the way to wealth and national in-
come growth-and out of poverty for the poor--was through a
vibrant, nonregulated marketplace and personal initiative.
Shortly after assuming office, Reagan signed the Omnibus Bud-
get Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. Among other things,
O3RA substantially cut public assistance benefits and punished
recipient family heads who were trying to improve their eco-
nomic lot. After passage of the OIIRA legislation, AFDC recipi-
ents found their child care expenses capped at S160 per month
per child; their deduction for work expenses limited to $75 per
month, and their earned income disregard (the first $30 per
month and one-third of income thereafter) eliminated after four
months. Combined with other measures, OBRA had a profound
impact on AFDC rolls, resulting in .408,000 families losing eli-
gibility and another 299,000 having their benefits reduced. In
effect, 5% of the total AFDC caseload became ineligible due to
OBRA, and about 3.5% of those who were workiiig were ter-
minated (Moffitt and Wold, 1987, p. 248). Monthly income loss
resulting from OBRA ranged from $229 in )allas to $115 in
Boston. In addition, former AI.)C beneficiaries in these cities
also lost Medicaid coverage. In Dallas, 59% of terminated fan-
ilies could not secure alternative health insiirmici ; in Boston,
27% (Moffitt and Wold, 1988).
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All told, the budget cuits of 1981 resulIed in a 11.7% redtc-
lion in AFDC funding, siffer eligibility reqtirements,'nnd a 19%
reduction in Food Stamps (other food programs were reduced
by 13%). In addition, the duration of unemployment insurance
was reduced by 13 weeks (Day, '19H)), Because of bldgt cuts
and other fiscal policies, the poverly rate in 198I climbe'd to
15.3%, higher than any year since the early 1960s (Kirg,,r and
Stoesz, 1990).
For Conservatives, simple redtictions in wel fa1rL' blaefits
failed to get at the licart of the problem. What was needed was
prew,iive medicine: the transformation of the very la\ siruc-
lure that generated the revenues necessary for welfare benefits.
Conservatives justified their position 1y arguing that if taxes
were less progressive, the rich would benefit; however, if the
poor were also providmd rebates they would benefil as well.
By exempting the poor from a predatory and reenssive tax
strirclure, Conservatives could cut (he flow of vital rv'ewTV'ns for
welfare programs and improve the lot of those in ecoinomic dif-
ficullv. Thus, Lax policy became social welfare policy., it in a
manner antithetical to the liberal understanding of both tax and
welfare policy (Stoesz and Karger, 1991).
Tax policy was reptatdly substituted for welfare' poliCy dur-
ing the Reagan adiniist ration.2 Claiming that the lii,'rde, of
inflation disproportioilutely affected those on limiled iiwo-mes,
Reagan'successfully argued for a tax cul soon after taking of-
fice, lhe concept of using tax expenditures-indirect paym~elts
through tax exemptions, credits, or rebates-as a proxy fior di-
rect welfare payments was a relatively recent possibility. In 1975
the -arned Income TIx Credit (EITC) was instituted wherCby
low-inco(me tax-payers were given a rebate. The EITC proved
to be just the program that conservatives were looking for as a
substitute for direct income maintenance payments.
Despite the increases in EI'C, the tax rebates failed to com-
pensate for the deep cuts in welfare programs macle mnder Rea-
gan. According to Kevin Phillips (19t9t0), "L o w-inc o m e families,
especially the working poor, lost appreciably more by ctls in
government services than they gailnd iin tax reduct oWV' (p). 87).
Moreover, because the wealthv continued to benefit fnrll less
progressive taxation, the income disparity between rich and
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poor widened. Between 1980 and 1990, the federal tax burden
for the richest quintile of taxpayers decreased 5.5%, while taxes
of the poorest fifth increased 16.1%. This loss of income occurred
despite the increased level of I'TC payments (Greenstein and
Barancik, 1990).
Although public assistance programs were an important lar-
get for Conservatives, the lion's share of federal expenditures
were in the social insurances. By tle middte 1970s Social Se-
curity began to show signs of being in trouble. Between 1975
and 1981, the Old Age and Survivors Fund saw a net decrease
in funds with a deficit in the reserve of between $790 million
and $4.9 billion a year, an amount that threatened to deplete
the reserve by 1983. Moreover, the prospects for Social Securily
seemed bleak. While the ratio of workers supporting beneficia-
ries was one to three, by the end of the century Ihe ratio was
expected to be two to one. The long term costs of Ihe program
would have thus exceeded its projected revenues.
Through 1981 OBRA, the Reagan administration was able to
exploit the Social Security crisis by whittling away at benefits,
including the elimination of benefits for postsecondary students,
and restrictions on payment of the death benefit. These reduc-
tions were expected to save the program $3.6 billion by 1983,
an amount insufficient to make up for future shortfalls. In or-
der to insure the future integrity of the Social Security sys(em,
the Reagan administration quickly empaneled a bipartisan com-
mission. Facing short and long-term problems, Congress moved
qtickly and passed P.L. 98-21-the Social Security Amendnients
of 1983. This legislation included various changes, such as a
dela'y in Cost-of-Living-Adjustments (COLA) and a stabilizer
placed on future COLAs. In addition, Social Security benefits
became taxable if taxable income plus Social Security benefits
exceed $25,000 for an individual or $32,000 for a couple. And,
by 2027 the retiremeint age was to be increased to 67 for those
wanting to collect full benefits. Although People could still re-
tire by age 62, they would receive only 70% of their benefits,
down from the current 80%. L.astly, coverage was extended:
new federal employees were covered for the first time, as well
as members of Congress, the president and vice-president, fed-
eral judges, and employees of, nonprofit corporations. For 1990,
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these changes added over $308 billion to lie Old Age Str-
vivors Insurance and Disabilily Insurance 'i'usi Funds (StoesZ
and Karger, 1991).
Although Liberals viewed the 1983 Social Security reforms
as a success, the major Conservative victories were less appar-
ent. By trimming benefits through ()BRA, UCmservatives hl
reversed decades of steady expansion of the Social Security pro-
gram; by increasing the regressive payroll tax through the 1983
amendlents they placed the solvency of thU p1rogram squarely
on the shoulders of middle-income workers. Thus, while total
annual federal revenue receipts from income lax fell from 17%
to under 45%, revenues from Social Security increased from 31
to 36%. Senator George Mitchell pegged the resulting income
redistribution from midde-income workers to the wealthy at
$80 billion (quoted in Phillips, 199(1, p. 8(0),
Despite the conservative ben of tlhe 1983 Social'Securitv
Amendments, the sharp erosion of income experienced by recip-
ients of public assistance programs was not rellicated in the so-
cial insurances. This was not for lack of creativity. Conservatives
fashioned privatized approaches to almost every governmen-
[a] function, including the substitution of Individual Retirement
Accounts for Social Security. And, despite his campaign pledge,
Reagan took on 1he social insurance programs. Through more
restrictive determinations for disability under Social Security,
the Reagan administration sharply reduced the number of ben-
eficiaries for disability payments. From 1981 to 1984, the number
of initial terminations for disability insurance were four times
that for the period of 1977-1980. B3etween 1978 and i83, the
number of disability beneficiaries declined by more than one
million, a reduction of 21.7'%. Although over half of those ter-
minated were to have their benefits restored by 1987, the net
result was the termination of 37% of cases (Committee on Ways
and Means, 1991)).
One of the areas hardest hit by the Reagan administration
was Unemployment Insurance (UI). In 1N75, over 75% of all
unemployed workers were covered by UI; by '1980 that tnm1ber
had dropped to 501%; and by 1988 it has dropped to a record
low of 31.5% (Karger and Stoesz, 1990). Beca use rates of ii i-
employment insurance coverage differ on a slate-by-state basis,
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these aggregate figures telt only part of the story. In states such
as Texas, -Virginia, South Dakota, Louisiana, Arizona, Indiana,
Georgia and Florida, the percentage of workers receiving un-
employment benefits in 1988 was at or below 20%.
While the unemployment rate came down from a high of
9.7% in 1982 to 5.5% in 1988, the status of the unemployed did
not return to the 1979 level. Specifically, the typical person who
became unemployed in 1979 remained out of work for a shorter
period of time (10.8 weeks) than in 1988 (13.5 weeks). Moreover,
in 1979 there were 535,000 people who were unemployed for six
months or more compared to 809,000 people in 1988 (Shapiro
and Nichols, 1989). At the same time that spells of unemploy-
ment increased, federal and state changes in the UX system made
it more difficult for unemployed workers to qualify for benefits.
For example, in 1988 it was more difficult for states to provide
extended coverage for an additional 13 weeks to workers who
had exhausted their 26 weeks of standard unemployment in-
surance benefits. In 1981, the threshold in which a state can pay
these extended benefits was substantially increased at the be-
hest of the Reagan administration (Shapiro and Nichols, 1989).
In short, federal policies enacted during the Reagan adminis-
tration formed a disincentive for states to extend or liberalize
their unemployment insurance coverage.
Income Maintenance Programs and the Reagan Legacy
The Reagan administration left an important ideological
legacy for the American welfare state, one that was cemented
through the creation of a massive budget deficit. The realization
of Reagan's ideological promises is best illustrated by the adop-
tion of the Family Support Act of 1988, the crowning domestic
achievement of his second term.
Although Conservatives were concerned about Social Secu-
rity, UI, and S5, their real attention had always been focused
on what they saw as the most vulnerable income maintenance
program-AFDC. Until the Reagan administration, welfare re-
form had a liberal connotation and reform proposals usually
called for expanding the scope, benefits, and eligibility of wel-
fare programs. However, by the 1980s conservative scholars be-
gan to develop plausible proposals for welfare reform, including
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serious proposals in the areas of workfare, community devel-
opment, and child welfare (Rabushka, 1980; Anderson, 1980;
Gilder, 1981; Meyer, 1981; Murray, 1984; Butler and Kondratas,
1987; Novak, 1987; Lind and Marshner, 1987). Within a short
period, the liberal hegemony in social welfare was confronted
by a group of scholars, who held a vastly different view of the
limits, scope and responsibilities of the American welfare sate.
Out of this melange of conflicting interests emerged the Family
Support Act of 1988.
The Family Support Act of 1988 was a compromise bill that
emerged from a Congress besieged by a huge federal budget
deficit. Although inherently conservativet the Family Support
Act appeared moderate in light of the proposals coming .from
the Reagan White House. For example, an earlier proposal made
by the Reagan administration, the Low-Income Opportunity
Act, would have effectively eliminated a poor mother's enti-
tlement to support from federal welfare programs. This pro-
posal would have given states wide latitude in program
design, eligibility guidelines, benefit levels,.and the allocation
of program resources.
Despite its conservative features, Representative Thomas
Downey, Chair of the House Subcommittee on Public Assis-
•tance, hailed the Family Support Act as the first "significant
change in our welfare system in 53 years" (Eaton, 1988, p. 15).
Under this bill, $3.34 billion was to be allocated over the first five
years for states to establish education and job-seeking programs
for AFDC recipients. During 1990 and 1991 states would have
to enroll at least 7% of AFDC parents in "workfare," and by
1995, the mandatory enrollment would rise to 20%. Although
the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program (covering two-parent
families) was made mandatory for all states, beginning in 1997
one parent will be required to work at least 16 hours'a week
in an unpaid job in exchange for benefits (Rich, 1988). Among
the more progressive provisions of the bill were the extension
of eligibility for day-care grants and Medicaid for one year after
leaving AFDC. This bill also mandated the automatic deduction
of child support from an absent parent's paycheck. Represen-
tative Dan Rostenkowski, Chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee (which oversees most welfare legislation), estimated
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impede self-sufficiency if beneficiaries were forced to do make-
work instead of seeking real work in the labor markel. Gar-
nishing wages of the noncustodial parent was also unlikely to
increase the economic independence of many female-headed
households or of low-paid male workers. In cases of marginal
incomes, garnishing wages of low-paid male workers can cre-
ate a disincentive to work.
The Family Support Act also did not alleviate the long-
standing erosion of cash grants to poor families. AFDC benefits
currently remain below the poverty level for all states, excepl
Alaska (Committee on Ways and Means, 1988), From '1970 to
1988, the median state's AFDC benefit dropped 35% (in con-
stant dollars) as a result of inflation. In other words, if AIFDC
benefits had kept up with inflation, beneficiaries in 1988 would
have received an additional $5.88 billion. 'he welfare reform
bill would redistribute to the poor only 57% of this lost incomne
($3. 34 billion) over a five year span. Moreover, even this inad-
equate reallocation would be diluted by channeling it through
a compulsory workfare program (Karger and Stoesz, 199).
Lastly, the Family Support Act bill failed to tackle one of the
most serious problems in AFDC-the lack of a national AFDC
benefit standard. Specifically, this bill did not rectify a system
which allows states such as Alabama, Kentucky, L.otisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Teninessee, and Texas to award a family of three an
AFDC grant of less than $200 per month (Karger and Stoesz,
1990). (In comparison, Alaska, California, Vermont, and Con-
necticut pay the same family over $600 per month.) Despite its
obvious shortcomings, three fundamental values of the Reagan
administration were reflected in the Family Support Act of 1988:
reciprocity, productivity, and familial responsibility.
Recipricity
Conservatives insist that welfare programs contribute to de-
pendency and dysfunctional behaviors, especially when benefits
are not linked to an expected standard of conduct. Charles Mur-
ray (1984) maintains that the very system designed to help the
poor has created dependency by penalizing the virtuous anti
rewarding the dysfunctional. Although reciprocity is promoted
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as a way to encourage socially desirable behavior in welfare
recipients, it is also becoming a pnecessary com onent to aid tie
public credibility of welfare programs.
Prodtciivilry
In order to survive in a highly comptlitive global economy,
the U.S. is forced to consider new ways to more effectively
utilize its labor force. Given the new economic realities, flie
ascendence of conservative values, and lhe severe budgetary
restraints, the federal government is likely to force social pro-
grams to become more congruent with economic productivity.
Within this context, relief will be defiled from-an emphasis on
welfare to one of work. Allying welfare with productivity will
also draw social programs closer to the American economic svs.,
tern, a strategy that may be necessary to justify future social
welfare expenditures.
Familial Responsibilily
Another ideological premise of the Family Support Act is the
belief that government should abandon its role as the "rescuer
of first resort." Retreating to traditional values, this philosophy
dictates that biological parents have the ultimate responsibil-
ity to support ticr offspring (thus justifying the stringent en-
forcement of child support laws). The values institutionalized in
the Family Support Act are likely to guide income maintenance
policies for at least the present decade.
To ensure that his domeslic agenda IVottId not beC temporary,
Reagan presided over the largest budget deficit in the history
of the United States. The scope of the federal budget deficit
is difficult to grasp. While the 1989 Gross National Product
(GNP) of the United States was $5 trillion, the budget deficit
was rapidly approaching $3 trillion. In other words, the fed-
eral budget deficit equalled three-fifths of the entire GNP in
1989. In 1988 the world traded a total of $2.7 trillion worth of
goods, less than the $2.83 Irillion U.S. federal budgel deficit in
the third quarter of 1989. Broken down, the federal debt ex-
ceeds over $13,000 for every man, woman, and child in the
United States. By creating anl enormous debt (from about $50
billion a year in the Carter term to betwevn $145 to $200 billion
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a year in the 1980s), [lie Reagan eco1omic legacy Piarilyzed the
growth of fiscal-based income maintenance programs, until the
next century.
While the Reagan adminis ration could rightfull y.claim i-na-
jor successes in reshaping American social welfare policy duriing
the 198s, its mosl important achievemenl was in ciealing a far-
reaching conservalive ambience. This lqacy is most visible in
the budgelt deficil reduction ipckage of I1990(.
The framework for the 1990 budget package was crealted by
the Lax-cits of the first Reagan ternn, which contributed it at, n
precedented budgel deficit. Thruighout Ihe late 1980s, Congress
and h1w Reagan, then Bush administratiolls, postponed tile day
when tie budget would have to be reconciled with the Graini-
Rudman-l[ollings Deficit Reduction Act. I lowever, facing a
huge i'evenue shortfall in 1990), [lie Con1greSS and the pr'esidenl
were forced to develop a more viable budgtl packag,. Reflecting
the difficult consequllences of aly serioUs budget cn npronlise,
the initial deal was ct t beyond 1e view of' IhC public and press
at Andrews Air [Force Base. [ailing to get past outraged lib-
eral I)einocrats and conservative Republicans (who had signed
a campaign pledge not to raist taxes), another round of bar-
gaining ensued.
On October 27, 1990, the louse and Senate appi'we-d sweep-
ing budgetaty legislation that maide changes in numliroulS enti-
tlement programs, raised Laxe% , placed ceilings oin defense
and noi-entit]ement spending programs, revised the Gramm-
Rudman-I lollings deficit targtls, and made important changes
in Congressional bitdget procedures. Tht next day, Congress
approved the final thirteen appropriations bills for fiscal year
1990 that set specific funding levels for htindreds of programs.
All told, these measures were desigled to reducc the deficit
by $42.6 billion in fiscal year 1991 and $496 billion frn 1991 to
1996. After a decade of punishing program cIt Is, Liberals greeted
the budget compromise with relief, since, it increased domestic
expenditures over a five year period by $22 billion (Shtosz and
Karger, 1991).
The deficit reduction program consisted of five eltlnenis: (a)
reductions in entitlement programs, (b) reductions in defense
spending, (c) increases in user fees foir government services,
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(d) tax increases, and (e) reduced interest payments on the na-
tional debt. Taken together, this budget package represented a
mixed bag of reforms. On the positive side, it contained pro-
gressive tax increases (the tax burden on the wealthy was to
go up more than for the middle class, and the tax burden on
households with incomes of less than $20,000 would actually de-
cline), the out-of-pockets costs borne by Medicaid beneficiaries
was reduced by two-thirds (poor Medicare beneficiaries were
shielded from the moderately higher Medicare rates), federal
programs targeted at poor or unemployed people were pro-
tected, Medicaid coverage was extended to poor children up
to age 18, low-income families with children were to receive
new or expanded tax credits under the 1ITC program (they are
slated to receive over $18 billion over the next five years), two
new grant programs were established to provide day care ser-
vices for low and moderate income families, and Medicaid was
expanded to include the functionally impaired elderly living
at home. In addition, the budget package contained increases
for Head Start, low income housing programs, and [lie WIC
program (Leonard and Greenstein, 1990). Significantly, Social
Security was safely "Off-budget," guarded by "firewall" proce-
dures in Congress (House Budget Committee, 1990). Congruent
with conservative values, the main beneficiaries of the budget
package were not public assistance recipients, but pour work-
ing families with children.
On the negative side, this package prohibited (he transfer of
funds between defense and domestic appropriations for three
years, thus precluding any peace dividends. In effect, prohibil-
ing the transfer of funds between defense and domestic bud-
get lines meant that social programs must compete with each
another for a fixed amount of funds, thereby making it more
difficult to fund new welfare initiatives. In addition, changes
in budgetary procedures shifted power fron a relatively liberal
Congress to the more conservative Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). For example, any breach of spending ceilings
for defense or domestic nonentillement programs will trigger
an across-the-board cut in that particular category of programs.
Hence, no entitlement program could be increased unless
such measures are offset by other entitlement programs or tax
binome Mainteniance
changes. The final arbiter of whether spending ceilings have
been violated or whether new tax thresholds have been reached
is the OMB (Leonard and Greenstein, 1990).
Although the tax changes in the deficit compromise were
progressive, Ihey did not profoundly affect the increasingly
skewed income distribution in the United States. A House Wid-
get Committee noted that the total tax increases under 1990
OBRA, 2.2% over five years, paled in contrast to the 1981 Rea-
gan tax cut of i6% (House Budget Committee, 1990). Moreover,
extension of Medicaid to cover every poor child is phased in
over a twelve year period, meaning that all poor children will
not be assured of health care until October 2002 (Leonard and
Greenstein, 1990).
The successes of the Reagan administration seems likely to
influence income maintenance policy tlirou ghnu t the present
decade. Income maintenance ideologies that stress reciprocity,
productivity, and familial responsibility represent a return to
traditional values of self-reliance, independence, individual re-
sponsibility, and the limited role of government. For Liberals
who advocate expanding social welfare programs, these values
represent a deterioration of the traditional liberal consensus that
guided American social welfare policy since World War 11.
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Notes
I. \lthough Nixon ended many of Ihe experimental programs of Owc, Great
Society, he did not curb welfare expenditures, which grew at a healthy
rate during his administralion. See Diane M. [JiNillo and "'hormas R. Dye,
Social welfare: Politics and publit' policy (lEnghwood (Cliffs. NJ: Pn'nlict-I lall.
Inc., 1987).
2, Reagan's emphasis on using tax payments as a suhslitute for diret welfare
payments waus continued through lhe Tax Re'forn Act of 1986. As a result
of a compromise with Liberals who were coit.rni-d about the cMiinued
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erosihn of the inconi of the working poor, t1w Tax Reform Ac of 1986
effectively removed roughly 6 million low-iicoie families from the tax
rolls, Inslad of paying laxes, these famillies received cash payments from
the Treasury through the EITC. On the olher hand, Liberals also agreed
to a more regressive lax structure in which the previous fourteen income
gradatimis were collapsed into just two.

